India Today’s Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) team analyzed a recent PLA film. It featured a border defense regiment from the Xinjiang Military Region. This analysis was done so that it can be understood how much the Chinese army tried to make this video.
As tensions between Ladakh and China increase in Ladakh, there has been a flood of pictures and videos on the Internet showing the drills of the Chinese Army in the Tibet region. Their production quality also seems to be beating the directors of action movies. This video is an important part of the strategy of the Chinese Army People’s Liberation Army (PLA) whose only aim is to intimidate the enemy.
India Today’s Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) team analyzed a recent PLA film. It featured a border defense regiment from the Xinjiang Military Region. This analysis was done so that it can be understood how much the Chinese army tried to make these videos. A short video released by PLA showed an actual team collision drill.
This 100-second film, shot in Hollywood style, shows the conflicting practice in the mountainous region. In this, 20 armed PLA reconnaissance officers and jawans can be seen participating. The video was shot from dozens of camera angles. This is an attempt to give the impression that this is a live military drill and it is not being shot just for the camera (where the drill is paused after every shot so that it can be moved from one camera to another). We can safely conclude that at least ten camera crew would have been used to cover all camera angles. Camera Crews posted at special positions.
Here, a look can be done behind the scenes of PLA’s propaganda video making.
The first scene begins with a three-second indoor shot where PLA soldiers can be seen taking up arms. The next scene involves a close-up shot of the same process but from a different angle.
A third camera is positioned just outside the huts (huts) where soldiers can be seen rapidly exiting with weapons.
The fourth camera is positioned near a military vehicle that captures close-ups of people on board.
The fifth is a drone-mounted airborne camera that shows two different shots of 20 people walking in a mountain valley.
The sixth camera is positioned to capture dramatic tracking shots of people moving as they continue to move toward the firing zone.
The seventh camera was placed near the stream of water before the firing zone. In it, more tracking shots of armed personnel moving towards the target zone were filmed.
The video shows multiple shots of the firing zone between 27 and 31 seconds, it can be understood that at least one camera was deployed to capture all the shots.
The ninth camera was needed to capture close-up shots of the snipers deployed on the hills.
The tenth unique camera was placed in the headgear of the armed people, which captures the position and targets of their guns.
Apart from these, there are interviews of PLA officers, mixed and moving cutaways, landscape shots, etc., which we have not counted, as they may have been shot using earlier cameras.
The analysis shows that video production of the drill is as important to the PLA as the drill itself. The scale of production is really enough to show how much importance is given to propaganda machinery from PLA.
Along with addressing domestic sentiments in China, the main objective of trying to show the strength of the Chinese armed forces in such propaganda videos as ‘larger than life’ may be to create surprise and awe in the opposing forces. Those Chinese armed forces are quite inexperienced with the real war situations.